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People who knowingly take risks are supposed to conduct 
themselves in a calm and matter-of-fact manner. If you are 
planning to go over Niagara Falls in a barrel, you are supposed 
to adopt a steady and even blase demeanor, as if this risk-taking 
were just a predictable part of a regular day's work. While I 
think I understand the theatrical demands here, there is still 
something about declaring that you are planning, in the space of 
half an hour, to give a summary history of a century of heated 
debate over the public lands, that makes a pretense of coolness 
and calmness a pretty hard set of stage directions to follow. 
You'll pardon me, then, if I break the first rule of public 
speaking and begin with a nervous apology, confessing that this 
is a very daunting assignment and alerting you to the probable 
fact that, should anyone choose to point out something important 
that I failed to mention in this presentation, I am planning to 
take the scoundrel's first line of defense, and explain that 
limits of time prevented me from paying proper attention to that 
important point, along with several hundred other points, as 
well. I guess there is something quite wonderfully unnerving 
about speaking immediately before a panel carrying the subject 
title, "Why We're Unhappy"--for fear that the panel's 
unexpectedly united response might prove to be: "Why are we
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Unhappy? Because of that disappointing and irritating speech we 
just heard1”
Now the first thing, and the most obvious thing, that 
historians have to say to participants in fights over public 
lands issues today, is this: this fight began before you were on
the planet. For many people, the long duration of these 
disagreements provides some comfort. Somehow, there is less 
injury available to take personally, when you realize that what 
you are participating in is virtually a cross-generational relay 
race of insult and accusation. One generation carries the burden 
of squabbling for its time, and then the torch is passed on, and 
the next generation takes on the obligation to squabble.
Let me, then, offer a quick chronology of this well- 
pedigreed, infinitely sustainable boxing match, and sketch the 
timing of its principal rounds.
Round One, roughly 1890 to 1910. The triggering change was 
the creation of the Forest Reserves and the exertion of 
supervisory power over them by Theodore Roosevelt and Chief 
Forester Gifford Pinchot. In response, some Westerners did a 
great deal of objecting to their loss of independence and free 
access to resources. The objecting aside, the concept of 
permanent federal possession of some public lands became 
established in both theory and practice.
Round Two, the 1920s. In this episode, President Herbert 
Hoover and his Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur tried 
to seize the opportunity of ongoing discontent with federal
2
management by initiating a proposal to cede the federal lands to 
the states. "The federal government," President Hoover said, in 
words that one is suprised not to hear quoted more often these 
days, "is incapable of the adequate administration of matters 
which require so large a measure of local understanding. We must 
seek every opportunity to retard the expansion of federal 
bureaucracy and to place our communities in control of their own 
destinies. . . . Western states have long since passed from their 
swaddling clothes and are today more competent to manage much of 
their affairs than is the federal government." Hoover's Garfield 
Commission concurred with this judgment at the end of the decade. 
Oddly, Westerners were not particularly energized by this 
opportunity, in large part because of the circumstances of the 
onset of the Depression. Thus, once upon a time, an official 
federal commission offered to reverse the disclaimer clause, by 
which entering Western states had disclaimed their rights to the 
public lands, and nothing much happened as a result.
Round Three, the 1930s. The principal event here was the 
passage of the Taylor Grazing Act, transferring much of the 
remaining public domain to federal management through a system of 
grazing leases and creating a wonderfully confusing new property 
right, the grazing right on public lands. Here, again, the 
conditions of the Depression blunted the region's usual reaction 
against federal interference, and this change came with 
substantial Western support. The usual polarizations of the 
public lands boxing match seemed reconfigured, and even
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diminished, for this brief phase.
Round Four, the 1940s. Resource-users renewed the 
complaints against restrictions on use of public lands resources, 
and demanded an increased power of governance for themselves and 
a reduction in the funding and power of the Grazing Service, soon 
to become the Bureau of Land Management. Led by the spirited and 
outspoken writings of Bernard DeVoto, conservationists resisted 
what they called a resurgent land grab.
Round Five, the 1960s and 1970s. Here the signal events 
were the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964, giving 
preservationist concerns real standing in statute and courtroom, 
and the mandating of multiple uses, including aesthetic and 
recreational concerns, in the program for the Bureau of Land 
Management through the Federal Land Policy and Management Act in 
1976. Similarly important was the conclusion, reached by the 
Public Land Law Review Commission and recorded in the prelude to 
FLPMA, declaring that the public lands would remain in permanent 
retention under federal ownership and management.
Round Six, the late 1970s and the 1980s. This is the phase 
of the Sagebrush Rebellion, a movement in clear reaction against 
the changes of Round Five, followed by the Reagan administration 
effort to readjust the balance of public lands policy, away from 
preservation and back toward use. In the denunciation of federal 
meddling and intrusion, and in the plea to return BLM lands to 
the states, the Sagebrush Rebellion seemed to be a repeat of and 
return to Round One; certainly the language often seemed to verge
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on direct quotation from the Westerners who had fought Theodore 
Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot eighty years before. Battles that 
were supposed to have been settled, battles that historians had 
pretty much said were settled, were now reopened, and the premise 
of permanent federal ownership, seemingly so clear in Round Five, 
was now open for dispute. And yet many of its opponents took the 
approach of casting the Sagebrush Rebellion as an empty and 
futile last gasp, one last revitalization movement undertaken by 
people working in extractive industries that were clearly being 
swept away by an urban-based enthusiasm for tourism, recreation, 
and aesthetic appreciation of Western nature.
Round Seven, which is now. Round Seven, which proves that 
the Sagebrush Rebellion was not exactly what you'd call a last 
gasp. Round Seven, which, by virtue of the 1994 midterm 
elections, with conservative, anti-government sentiment now well 
represented in the House and Senate, might turn out to make the 
Sagebrush Rebellion look like the 1970s rhetorical prelude to the 
acts of substance of the 1990s, with the door seemingly wide open 
to revived discussions of privatization and/or cession of the 
public lands to the states.
Round Seven surprised a lot of people, and it certainly 
surprised me. It surprised me so much that I was forced to 
realize how much I myself had fallen for that very popular 
premise that many of these issues were supposed to be settled; 
many controversies were supposed to have been filed away in 
permanent storage; many disputes and disagreements were supposed
5
to have moved into that category in response to which the eyes of 
regular people glaze over as they say, "This topic is now of only 
historical interest." All these issues, controversies, disputes, 
and disagreements have broken out of the file cabinets and 
archives and monographs and casebooks in which they were supposed 
to have been permanently interred.
In moments of deep disorientation, historians go for time- 
depth, and this is clearly one of those moments. So let us 
reverse the logic of chronology, and briefly return to the era 
before Round One, before the onset of the conservation movement. 
In assessing the contentiousness of our own times, it is 
important to acknowledge the many fights and struggles that 
occurred before the 1880s and 1890s. While they generally agreed 
that the federal government should preside over a process of 
transferring the public domain to private ownership, white 
Americans disagreed with each other about the prices that people 
should pay to acquire title to the public lands. They disagreed 
about the size of the plots of land that should be made available 
to any individual owner. They disagreed about the process by 
which land should be surveyed, platted, claimed, and certified 
for ownership. Thus, while it is safe to say that white 
Americans shared, for most of the nation's first century, an 
agreement on the rightness of transferring land to private 
ownership, it would certainly be a mistake to imagine that they 
lived in a lost age of harmony and consensus. White Americans 
fought each other over the terms of disposal of the public
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domain, and that, of course, was only one aspect of the fighting. 
While issues of culture, religion, and politics played important 
roles in the wars between whites and Indians, those wars were 
also battles over real estate, battles over the control and 
ownership of land. So anyone who thinks that the last century's 
debate has been distinctively contentious and disheartening, and 
anyone who imagines a preceding age of greater agreement, should 
be sent off to read the records of the white/Indian wars, as well 
as the records of often fierce Congressional debates over land.
But there was one element of harmony in this early history, 
and it may be the disappearance of this element that has led to 
the greatest bewilderment and frustration in our times. For much 
of the nation's first century, white Americans had the comfort of 
believing that individual self-advancement and profit followed 
the same path as national advancement and profit. In the cause 
of westward expansion, the individual (or the individual with his 
family) could pursue his own economic interests, seeking farmland 
or minerals or business opportunity in the West, and feel that he 
was at the same time engaged in national service. Expanding 
American settlements was patriotic duty; if the performance of 
patriotic duty rewarded the individual with profit and property, 
that was only further proof that the nation and the individual 
shared the same values and pursued the same good.
But now we come back around to Round One of the debate, the 
1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century, over 
permanent federal ownership of public lands, in which that unity
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Oneof personal interest and national interest began to waver, 
signal for the beginning of Round One was the emerging use, m  
the 1870s and 1880s, of the term "timber famine," the growing 
fear that the unrestrained exploitation that had eliminated the 
forests of the upper Midwest might be about to move on to the 
forests of the Trans-Mississippi West. If those forests took the 
same trouncing that the Midwestern forests had undergone, more 
and more Americans began to worry, wouldn't the nation be put at 
risk— at risk of having to figure out how to maintain a thriving 
economy without the crucial material for building and 
construction? Individual profit-seeking would then no longer be 
national service; on the contrary, individual profit-seeking 
would erode the base of the nation's security and prosperity.
If you have been reading these proclamations of concern over 
a prospective timber famine, then Congress's action, in 1891, 
creating the process that would allow the president to designate 
forest reserves, makes a great deal of sense. Contemplating the 
early origins of federal conservation can be a wonderfully 
disorienting experience— one has to think, for instance, of 
Grover Cleveland, not simply as the fellow who ran for office 
while stories of his having fathered an illegitimate child 
pursued him. (You remember the verse, a verse well worth keeping 
in mind when we decry the decline in the level of political 
discourse in our own times: "Ma, Ma, where's my Pa?/Gone to the
White House, ha ha ha.") In this story, Grover Cleveland 
emerges as a man of courage and vision in his willingness to
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designate Forest Reserves and to press Congress to come up with a 
system for their management. This reappraisal is certainly good 
news for Cleveland, even if it works to remove a little of the 
lustre and originality from Theodore Roosevelt and his trusted 
forester friend, Gifford Pinchot.
So in Round One, in response to the prospect of a dangerous 
timber famine, Congress invented the idea of forest reserves; 
Presidents began to respond to the opportunity presented by this 
invention; and some Westerners began to express outrage over this 
fundamental change in the rules. There is a very important 
things to note in this: namely, the outraged Westerners were
right— they were not subject to paranoid delusions— this was a 
fundamental change in the rules, a change from disposal to 
retention, and a change dividing individual benefit from national 
benefit.
This idea is going to come up several times this morning, 
and probably more times in the course of this conference. Until 
I had to work on this presentation, I had never noticed how much 
all of the present participants in public lands debates—  
proponents of federal management, resource-users who oppose 
federal management, environmentalists who sometimes support and 
sometimes criticize federal management, historians, students in 
American history survey courses— I had never realized how every 
single one of us. for all our disagreements, agree on one, 
completely misguided assumption: that somewhere in this story of
the public lands, the rules got firmed up, settled on, agreed on,
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resolved, defined, figured out. We date this moment of 
resolution differently, but we all bank on the notion that on 
some occasion— whether it was the creation of Forest Reserves 
that were still supposed to accommodate the needs of legitimate 
timber-users; or the creation of advisory boards for the Grazing 
Service, boards that gave a great role for the resource-users to 
play; or the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964; or the 
passage of FLPMA in 1976; wherever we date this moment, we think 
that was the moment when the real rules took shape, and whatever 
failures of rule-observance that happened after that moment are 
just wrong and literally against the rules. When the rules we 
like got established, that was the moment of resolution, of 
definition, of consolidated, settled progress; when those rules 
got violated, changed, or replaced, that was when unfairness set 
in.
So a number of Western resource users in the 1890s and the 
first decade of the twentieth century thought that the rules had 
been changed on them, and they were right. But the pattern of 
though persisted through the century, that sense of injury over 
the changeability of the rules, the urge to believe in that 
elusive moment of final victory or final defeat. My personal 
feeling is that we have all been ruined by hearing and telling 
stories, by reading novels, by watching movies and TV shows. 
Exposure to these narrative forms has ruined us, because they all 
come with endings, and they create in us the expectation that the 
stories of our lives and our society will also come with endings.
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The implementation of the Taylor Grazing Act will conclude the 
story of the public lands by making it clear that henceforth 
resource-users must play a definitive role in the governance of 
the public lands; the passage of the Wilderness Act will conclude 
the story by making it clear that henceforth the aesthetic value 
assigned to untouched nature will have to be reckoned into land 
use questions; the report of the Public Land Law Review 
Commission and the passage of FLPMA will conclude the story by 
making it clear that the public lands will henceforth be retained 
in permanent federal ownership. Time will, of course, move on, 
but, in the future, we will play within the rules— the 
"henceforths"— established at these defining moments.
Well, surprise. For just about everybody, that "henceforth" 
has proven to be a trick. There is no conclusion to this story;
t;
there is no moment when the "permanent" rules got established and 
defined. Public land policy remains a process of maddening 
historical changeability and contingency, and I think that is one 
principal reason why everyone got so cranky in our times— because 
resource-users or environmentalists, everyone thought that the 
history of the public lands had reached some kind of defining 
moment, some kind of future-policy-determining conclusion, some 
occasion when the real rules got written, affirmed, ratified, and 
implemented.
So things were unsettled a hundred years ago, and things are 
unsettled now, and it is quite common to hear people say that 
this unsettlement is only another repetition of a repeated cycle.
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I want to take a moment to record samples of the denunciations of 
the Forest Reserves denunciations made at the turn of the 
century. As you listen, you might ask yourself, Does history 
repeat itself? Am I listening to a broken record, then and now? 
Or are the people who are saying the things that sound like this 
today, in fact, intentionally and knowingly echoing their 
predecessors, but imitating that older language in what are 
actually very changed circumstances?
Here are appraisals of the Forest Reserves, in the judgment 
of some Westerners a hundred years ago: the Reserves were "a
program designed to harass and annoy"; they were "crackpot 
schemes of politicians in Washington"; "as nefarious a scheme as 
ever disgraced the nation"; "the dude design for an outdoor 
museum and menagerie"; "the destruction of the people who have 
gone and built up homes"; "a reckless exercise of power"; "rank 
imbecility"; "obnoxious measures of Eastern visionaries"; 
"intolerable usurpations of power"; "a system paralyzing all 
progress"; "an un-American carpetbag system of government."
And here are characterizations, from the enemies of 
conservation at the turn of the century, of the people behind the 
Forest Reserves: "the aesthetic Eastern people who are not
interested in the country and who will plaster the West with 
reservations that will retard and cripple the hardy pioneers"; 
"sentimentalists and dudes"; "theorists, enthusiasts, cranks"; 
"ill-informed bureaucrats in Washington offices"; "a few 
theorists who learned their forestry by reading about European
12
forests"; "distant dictators with only a theoretical knowledge of 
the West"; "people who do not know a ranch from a pink tea 
party"; "goggle-eyed, bandy-legged dudes from the East and sad­
eyed, absent-minded professors and bugologists."
So we hear characterizations in a similar spirit today. Is 
this a repetition of history, a recurring cycle that bears some 
resemblance to the way night follows day and day follows night? 
Summer follows spring, spring follows winter, winter follows 
autumn, autumn follows summer, and phases of Western crankiness 
and ill-temper follow phases of Western affability and 
collaborativeness?
I do not, myself, really believe history really runs through 
cycles— not in wars, presidents, cultural enthusiasms, economic 
events, or public lands debates. I do think, however, that 
people often make conscious appeals to history. I think they 
consciously and knowingly adopt the fashions, language, and 
behavior of historical figures. People sometimes imitate and 
echo the people of the past in a way that can make it seem that 
historical cycles are rolling over and over, rather in the manner 
of a Ferris wheel. Americans who are defying centralized 
authority have a perfectly understandably habit of citing the 
inspiration of the American Revolution, or sometimes even the 
defiance of the Confederacy. This does not mean that either 
George Washington or Robert E. Lee is about to ride again; it 
only means that their example is being borrowed, adopted, and 
appropriated to serve some purpose and in some cause, in what are
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actually very different conditions.
The word "cycles1 does appear in the description of this 
talk, and that, in itself, demonstrates how recently I have 
myself come to reject this idea. What finally caught up with me 
may well have been the problems involved in being a big Roy 
Orbison fan. I have always admired Roy Orbison a great deal, but 
necessity still requires one to admit that some of his songs are 
deeply silly. In the album released just at the time of his 
death, there is an extremely goofy song, in which Roy is playing 
his usual role of the abandoned lover. But this time the setting 
is both distinctive and ridiculous: he has gotten on a Ferris
wheel, and his girlfriend and her new boyfriend have stopped the 
Ferris wheel while Roy's little chair is at the top, and then the 
girlfriend and the new boyfriend have left the amusement park, 
and left Roy to sit in his lonely perch, until someone in the 
morning can come to his rescue and start the wheel rotating 
again.
This absurd song, posing as it does a terrible test of 
loyalty and affection for all of Roy's fans, may be what brought 
me to my senses, causing me to realize that this "cycles of
i
history" phrase is a terribly deadening metaphor and figure of 
speech. A cycle of history finally has all the flexibility and 
contingency and variation of a Ferris wheel ride; you go up, you 
come down, you go up again, and (barring the misfortune that 
befell Roy) you come down again. Your best hope for excitement 
is a great view from the top, or a treacherous girlfriend with
14
close, personal ties to the fellow running the wheel.
The cycles of a Ferris wheel, just like the cycles of 
history, lack narrative drama. They also give the rider 
absolutely nothing to exercise in the way of human will and 
choice. You can ride your cycle of history with terror or you 
can ride it with pleasure, but the cycles follow exactly the same 
path either way.
I do not think the phases of debate over the federal 
government's retention of the public lands constitute a repeated 
set of cycles, because of two things. First, I believe that a 
comparatively widespread discomfort with the idea and practice of 
permanent federal ownership of public lands never disappeared.
The reason for that is twofold, and obvious: because federal
ownership Of public lands has constricted some people's free 
choice and economic opportunity, and because federal ownership of 
public lands is at odds with a widespread definition of the 
appropriate and limited role of the federal government; in 
contrast to a theoretically much purer, if also potentially much 
more destructive, kind of democratic access, federal management 
of public lands is autocratic and even elitist. Thus, the 
discontent never went away, but it did get louder and quieter; it 
got more and less visible; or, maybe most to the point, it got 
more publicized and less publicized— but I don't think it ever 
went away. Cycles of publicity are, after all, quite different 
from cycles of history, though if one is keeping one's eye on the 
most available records, it is easy enough to confuse the two.
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My second reason for rejecting the "cycles" notion is that 
the circumstances surrounding each phase of the public lands 
debate are simply too different, even though the attacks on 
federal management, then and now, certainly sound the same in 
temper and spirit. At the turn of the century, the federal 
government really changed the rules. No wonder some Westerners 
were angry; Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford PinChot really were 
setting up a new game, very different from the days of open 
access. But that game and its rules are hardly "new" in the 
1990s. And, just as important, the usual "Easterners against 
Westerners" polarity is nowhere near as clear as it might have 
seemed a century ago. By this point in time, many federal land 
management officials are not Eastern outsiders or invaders, but 
Westerners themselves, while many, probably most, of the men who 
had been shaping federal land policy in Congress have been from 
the West themselves. To pit the West against the East may have 
been fine and often effective rhetoric, but it was poor history, 
and poor sociology, of the public lands debate.
One of the principal problems of the West/East formulation 
has been this: the West never had one voice or one point of
view, at any point in history. If you want a down-to-earth, 
concrete reminder of this, look at the Official Proceedings of 
the Colorado Conservation Commission from 1909 and 1910. First, 
one has to be struck by the fact that Western states had their 
own conservation commissions; conservation was not simply a 
federal mandate descending from outside. Before they had
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conservation commissions, Western territories and states had 
established Fish and Game commissions; in other words, the active 
role of the states in conservation is a much under-studied story, 
but we know enough to say that support for governmentally-managed 
conservation had roots in many places besides Washington, D.C.
Second, one has to be struck by the diversity of opinion 
that appears in the records of the Colorado Conservation 
Commission. Here is the testimony of Ellsworth Bethel, Professor 
of Botany in East Side High School in Denver in 1909: "The 
spirit of carelessness and vandalism which manifests itself in 
the destruction of forests, birds, wild flowers and scenery must 
be repressed either through laws or by propagating a sentiment of 
protection and kindness towards every living thing." Well, so 
much for that urbanite and botanist, Professor Bethel, one could 
say; hardly a typical voice of the West with that profile. But 
then here is Mr. J. B. Killian, President of the Delta County 
Stock Growers' Association, speaking to the Commission in 1909.
If you have yielded to the notion of a united Western voice and 
point of view, you may think you know what the president of the 
Delta County Stock Growers' Association was going to say about 
Forest Reserves, but prepare for surprise: "With the excessive
misuse and waste of the God-given resources of our public domain 
there has followed [an] awful depletion of timber, forage and 
moisture," Mr Killian told the Commission. Working with their 
neighboring Forest Reserve, he and his stockraising neighbors now 
enjoyed "peace, protection and prosperity, instead of suffering
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the pangs of friction, bloodshed., and criminality." The Forest 
Reserve had brought stability. "We know today what we may expect 
tomorrow." "It seems folly," Mr. Killian said, "for men to 
assert that this whole commonwealth is up in arms against what 
they term 'Pinchot's Bureaucracy.' We endorse the administration 
as we find it."
The voice of the West then and the voice of the West now 
were and are full of variation. We lose a great deal of clarity 
and accuracy when we say things like, "The West opposed Gifford 
Pinchot and the Forest Reserves," or "The West today is in revolt 
against federal land management." Some Westerners asked for 
Forest Reserves to be created in their locales; some Westerners, 
once Reserves became their neighbors, thought that this had been 
a pretty good development. No partisan today can claim to have 
inherited the mantle from those earlier times; no one can claim 
to be the true and authentic spokesperson for the Westerners of 
the past, because Western opinion has never fallen into clear and 
easy patterns.
But now we reach the aspect of the present circumstances 
that shows the greatest difference from the situation at the turn 
of the century: now, it seems to me, it is really not sufficient
to look at the public lands debate in a regional context. There 
is a great necessity to look beyond the West to understand the 
public lands debate today. I refer to the post-Watergate and 
post—Iran/Contra cynicism about government; I refer to the 
widespread disillusionment with federal handling of matters like
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health care and urban decline and racial equity and deficit 
management; I refer to the widely dispersed, sometimes quite 
scary anti-government feeling abroad in the land; and I refer, as 
well, to the post-Cold War loss of national orientation, the loss 
of a reliable sense of who our enemies are and what, in turn, our 
common enterprise against those enemies might require of us.
Think, if you will, of what an ill-advised move it would be for 
one of the presidential candidates in 1996 to borrow the rhetoric 
of 1960 and to campaign with the refrain, "Ask not what your 
country can do for you, but what you can do for your country."
Ask what you can do for your country, indeed; ask, instead, how 
to keep your country off your back and out of your way. In this 
sense, then, the public lands debate is now situated in a much 
broader and much more troubling set of questions about national 
coherence and shared purpose.
An even more puzzling and troubling part of our times has to 
do with the widespread pattern of people casting themselves as 
victims. After a phase of white people listening to people of 
color talk about victimization, white people seem, in the 1990s, 
to have adopted the position, "We'd like to use some of that 
rhetoric for ourselves, too." And so many white Americans— and 
here the Wise Use sorts are part of a much bigger trend— have now 
cast themselves as the real victims, the ones whose victimization 
is made all the more unjust because this was supposed to be their 
country, with a government that was supposed to work in their 
interests. Indeed, when it comes to absorbing the blame and
19
responsibility that no one wants to claim for themselves, the 
handiest target around is the federal government.
.y
So these are quite different times, in political culture,
quite a world apart from the world of the early twentieth
century. And yet no one can discount the continued resonance of
the words of H. H. Eddy, of Denver, speaking to the Colorado
Commission on Conservation in 1909, on the subject of the "Ethics
of the National Forests." How can we get the best administration
of the Forest Reserve system? Mr. Eddy asked his audience.
How can this best be done? [Can we get it] by treating 
the administration of the forests from a personal 
standpoint; by ridicule; by vituperation; by 
exaggerated . . . criticism; by overlooking the good 
that is being done and exhausting our energies in 
seeking and publishing to the world every instance of 
friction or hardship that may have resulted from 
misconstrued or misapplied law or overzealous service, 
thus embittering . . . the general public against not 
[only] those who administer the forests, but as well 
against the idea [of the reserves] itself? Or would it 
be better to pursue the other alternative, and work 
with the administration rather than against it, 
encourage it for the great good that it is undoubtedly 
doing, and criticise only with a desire and in the 
spirit of progress and improvement?
We can say that Mr. Eddy lived, and asked his question, in much
more innocent times, without a full understanding of the rat's
nest of issues the Forest Reserves would inspire, and certainly
without an understanding of the sense of helplessness, impotence,
frustration that individuals can feel when they face off
against a large federal bureaucracy. For all that, Mr. Eddy's
question still seems to me one of those moments when a long-dead
person suddenly seems alive, and suddenly addresses his
posterity addresses us, in the present, with a question we still
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have to answer even if its asker has left the planet. What do we 
say to Mr. Eddy, eighty-six years later? If we want the best 
resolution to the questions of the public lands, do we reach that 
resolution by ridicule and vituperation, by reciprocal name­
calling and condemnation? Can we criticize, as he said, in the 
spirit of the greater good, or do we have to report to Mr. Eddy 
that we no longer have a clue, individually or collectively, what 
that concept of the "greater good" means in practice? Mr. Eddy 
awaits our answer, as do several million others whose interests, 
emotions, and history are invested in the public lands. Has our 
long history of squabbling on this topic just made us all the 
more enthusiastic and skilled as fighters. Or, in ways that this 
conference might demonstrate, can an awareness of our inheritance 
of conflict and contention make us at least a little more 
sensible and careful about how we fight?
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